In case you missed it, the sentencing of Father Jacques Faucher has been delayed/postponed until 16 February 2017, three days after a previous scheduled court date on his breach charges:
16 February 2017: 2 pm, decision, Ottawa Ontario courthouse (161 Elgin St.)
It’s interesting that the judge opted to postpone his decision. The chance that the decision was not prepared are virtually nil. So, why put it on hold?
Is it possible that the judge was deeply disturbed by news that Faucher was lurking around the swimming pool and, without doubt, getting his perverse jollies by, at the very least, ogling at children? I hope so, but not sure.
Is it possible that Faucher will enter a guilty plea to the breach charges and that then sentencing on the breach conviction will be lumped in with the sex abuse sentencing? Yes. I think it’s possible. Highly possible.
Unless of course Faucher can come up with some very plausible and rational explanation as to why he deliberately breached his release conditions? Try as I might I can not think of any.
Will Father Faucher fare better or worse if sentencing on a breach charge is incorporated into the judge’s sentencing decision? I have no idea. But, it doesn’t look too good does it? An 80 year-old clerical molester violating his release conditions in such a blatant fashion? Hanging around the children’s pool? Watching. Watching. Watching.
Ogling. Maybe even leering?
He may well fare worse if the breach is incorporated. IF, for example the judge was set to impart a gentle “Tut. Tut, Bad bad boy!’ then the reality would be that all the hanging around/ogling at the pool really doesn’t look too good and would not serve Faucher well, would it?
On the other hand, he may well fare better, IF, for example, the judge was already committed, as they say, to throw the book at Father Faucher. IF the latter were the case, then chances are high that the sentencing on a breach conviction would simply run concurrent.
And, of course, let’s not forget that Faucher is in jail right now. Unless something has changed, he’s still behind bars. He’s been there since he was arrested on the breach charge. So, there will be a pat on the back or two for time served, and especially for time served prior to sentencing.
Anyway, and as always, we shall see.
Meanwhile the victims who have been waiting since March of last year for sentencing, and since February and March of 2013 to see justice done, wait. (Thankfully there was no motion to stay!)
Let’s pray that justice is done and a just sentence befitting this man’s perverted crimes is rendered.
Please keep the victims in your prayers.
[Note the correction in the Ottawa Citizen. The swimming pool is the Centre aquatique Paul-Pelletier in Quebec. It is not in Ontario. That explains why the Gatineau police were handling it.}
In yesterday’s “Another ‘read it and weep'” post I expressed concern regarding the nearly four years it will take to get the Marcel Lalonde case in Cornwall to trial. I linked to an article and said I would try to post it on Sylvia’s Site later.
Well, here it is, along with a few others which will bring us up to speed:
In rounding those up it seemed proper to also dig up and post the nub of it all, the 2016 Supreme Court of Canada ruling which has set deadlines of 18 months for provincial and 30 months for superior court cases to get to trial from time charges were laid. Here it is:
I cannot tell a lie. I have not yet read through the 130 pages. I did however glance through looking for specifics. Here then is an excerpt from page 5:
At the heart of this new framework is a presumptive ceiling beyond which delay — from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial — is presumed to be unreasonable, unless exceptional circumstances justify it. The presumptiveceiling is 18 months for cases tried in the provincial court, and 30 months for cases in the superior court (or cases tried in the provincial court after a preliminary inquiry). Delay attributable to or waived by the defence does not count towards the presumptive ceiling.Once the presumptive ceiling is exceeded, the burden is on the Crown to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances. If the Crown cannot do so, a stay will follow. Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown’s control in that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) they cannot reasonably be remedied.